Diplomacy 4.0 Navigating the AI Era: Geopolitics, Diplomacy, and the Power of Artificial Intelligence

“It is clear that AI will remain a permanent feature of international debates and will continue to shape societies and international relations. It is impossible to ignore the challenges – and opportunities – AI is bringing to the diplomatic realm” (DiploFoundation, 2019, p. 6).

Artificial Intelligence (AI) impacts every aspect of humanity, including the relationship between countries and the current world order. In this blog post, I write about how machine learning (ML) is transforming the international system where diplomacy takes place.
 
As seen in my previous posts, to better understand the impact of AI on diplomacy, DiploFoundation (2019) proposes to evaluate it from three different perspectives: 

• AI as a diplomatic tool that helps diplomats and MFAs perform their duties in areas such as consular affairs, public diplomacy, crisis management, and diplomatic negotiations.
• AI as a diplomatic topic, where the negotiations focus on how to regulate these applications best so they do not harm people and realize AI´s great potential. 
• The way AI affects “the environment in which diplomacy is practiced” (DiploFoundation, 2019, p. 6), e.g., the changes in the world’s geopolitics.

 
The most striking facts about how AI is influencing the diplomatic environment are two: 

1. The development of machine learning is being done mostly by private companies, not public entities, which has profound implications for governments and geopolitics. 
2. The huge concentration of this technology in only two countries, the United States and China, and their increasing rivalry. 

 
These two elements significantly affect the balance of power in military and economic terms (DiploFoundation, 2019, p. 6), which is transforming the current geopolitical landscape. Let´s start discussing the increasing international role of the private sector, especially the tech giants (Alibaba, Alphabet -Google-, Amazon, Apple, Baidu, Meta -Facebook-, Microsoft, and Tencent).

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“While AI will not reshape the global balance of power in [2024], it will become an increasingly important arena of geopolitical competition” (McCaffrey et al., 2023).

 
Tech giants: Global powerhouses of cyberspace 
 
The power that technology companies have today in global politics is a tremendous difference from previous geopolitical changing technology. For example, governments developed nuclear weapons, even if there was some private company participation.
 
In the case of AI, only a handful of enterprises have enough computing power, access to huge data sets, money, and technical know-how. No government entity can compete with them. According to some studies, most developments in AI have been done by private companies and not research institutes or universities (Pavel et al., 2023; Maslej et al., 2023). 
 
As we see in the discussion of the regulation of foundation models as part of the EU AI Act, these are the heart of all machine learning. Most AI applications today use some of the foundational models of OpenAI (ChatGPT and Bing.chat), Google (Bard now running on Gemini), Anthropic (Claude), and Inflection (Pi). There are some open-source foundational models, like Meta´s LLAMA 2 and Mistral´s Mixtral 8x7B, that, once they are released, anybody can use to create different applications. “AI is transforming almost every sector of national economies and is accelerating globalized competitions among digital platforms and services” (Schmidt, 2022, p. 288).
 
As the Starlink saga in Ukraine has demonstrated, companies now have the power to influence the outcome of an international conflict (Sauer, 2023; Giles 2023; Marcus, 2023). “There is little precedent for a civilian’s becoming the arbiter of a war between nations in such a granular way, or for the degree of dependency that the U.S. now has on [Elon] Musk in a variety of fields, from the future of energy and transportation to the exploration of space” (Farrow, 2023).
 
Bremmer and Kupchan (2022) point out that the globe is moving towards a technopolar world, in which “states are facing a new form of competition from technology companies. Indeed, the latter exercise a form of sovereignty over an entirely new dimension of geopolitics: digital space” (p. 5). The problem is that “big tech firms have neither the capacity nor the interest (not to mention the business model) to govern the places and tools they are creating” (Bremmer & Kupchan 2022, p. 6), thus creating a governance gap, that countries are trying to close with some regulations, such as the brand new EU AI Act, the U.S. Executive Order on AI, and China´s AI regulations. 
 
However, Marcus (2023) explains that we already live in a technopolar realm, highlighting three examples. The first is the debate on open-source AI systems, in which tech leaders are deciding on behalf of humanity with its inherent risks for all. Secondly, technology companies rather than the government determine collaboration on AI developments with other nations, which could have significant security consequences. Lastly, Elon Musk´s decision regarding the Starlink connection in Ukraine had a tangible impact on the conflict. 
 
The US–China AI competition
 
Many authors have stated that the US and China are already fighting a Cold War, especially in the ML and semiconductors realms. However, there are still some instances of collaboration between the two AI titans. The bilateral AI race is critical as the two countries' actions already have a significant bearing on the rest of the world. Leadership in AI has become the frontier of US-China geostrategic competition” (Lazard Geopolitical Advisory, 2023, p. 7).
 
In terms of hardware (including chips), it is clear that there is no cooperation, and each country has actually taken steps to reduce the opportunity for the other. The US first imposed export license requirements for certain companies and later expanded it to restrict exports of the machines that create the most sophisticated semiconductors used to power machine leaning systems (Sheehan, 2022). In October 2023, the US expanded those restrictions. On the other hand, China has been expanding the prohibition of exports of rare minerals and related technology needed to build semiconductors and other high-tech products such as batteries (Liu & Patton, 2023).
 
Both countries are also working on the dual race of AI innovation and regulation domestically and internationally, which will have significant consequences for the rest of the world (McCaffrey et al., 2023). In addition, other countries have joined the AI race, including the EU, Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia (Cesareo & White, 2023). Even countries like the UAE are marching ahead as the only country in the world that has established a Ministry of State for Artificial Intelligence.
 
It is clear that the US-China AI competition has geopolitical consequences for the world and in the corridors of international organizations discussing AI regulations and ministries of foreign affairs. But, as one article mentions, the clear winner is AI so far (Cuéllar & Sheehan, 2023), as both are supporting innovation over regulation for fear of losing the AI race. Companies are also big winners on both sides as they are let loose to develop further machine learning systems and applications with little oversight and restrictions.
 
The AI competition is closely related to the use of machine learning algorithms in conflicts. The evolution of lethal autonomous weapons systems is particularly worrisome, as discussed in the next section. 
 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)
 
An essential development regarding AI is Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), which can change how countries wage wars. For more information on international efforts, check out this Digwatch page GGE -Group of Governmental Experts- on lethal autonomous weapons systems.
 
At the core of the discussion is what happens when these systems turn against their creators or any human. It is very different to let an ML application recommend a song or a product to help you develop a strategy using big data analysis, and another totally different is to allow a computer system to kill a person by launching missiles from a UAV without human intervention. 
 
In recent days, there have been reports of Israel´s use of AI in Gaza (Davies, Mckernan, & Sabbagh, 2023). So, the use of machine learning in war is leaving the realm of fiction into reality, with all its consequences. As more countries rely upon such systems, war is changing substantially.
 
A few days ago, on December 22, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution regarding LAWS, requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a report on this issue based on consultation with a wide array of stakeholders (Digwatch, 2023). It is a vital milestone as there is an urgent need to make sure the LAWS race to the bottom does not take the same pace as we are seeing it on the launching of Large Language Models. 
 
Preliminary conclusions
 
The AI era is upon us, quickly transforming the international system and diplomacy. The exponential rate of ML developments is staggering and will be challenging to regulate in a highly contentious international environment. “The dual race to innovate and regulate [AI] will accelerate towards distinct geopolitical blocks” (McCaffrey et al., 2023, p. 7), centering around the US and China. However, the real powerholders of the digital realm are the tech giants, the only ones who can afford to develop the hugely costly ML foundational models. 
 
Artificial Intelligence “competition will continue to play out across the four bottlenecks [computing power, talent, data, and physical infrastructure] in the AI supply chain (Lazard Geopolitical Advisory, 2023, p. 19). This is in addition to achieving “self-reliance in critical technologies” (McCaffrey et al., 2022, p. 12).
 
Regarding regulation, “Expect big headlines about how world capitals are bringing big tech to heel. But these are regulatory rear-guard actions, none of which will challenge big tech’s massive profits and influence anytime soon. Nor will they limit the biggest platforms’ ability to invest those profits in the digital sphere where they, not governments, remain the primary architects, actors, and enforcers” (Bremmer & Kupchan 2022, p. 6).
 
Sadly, most countries worldwide will be lagging, with a few exceptions, subjugated by the AI Empire (Tacheva & Ramasubramanian, 2023). Besides implementing AI National Strategies and a Digital Foreign Policy, Global South governments could deploy technology diplomacy schemes to keep up with changes and establish relationships with tech giants. 
 
The development of AI has brought a new set of international actors that will dramatically change diplomacy. “As AI continues to advance, geopolitics may never be the same. Humans organized in nation-states will have to work with another set of actors—AI-enabled machines—of equivalent or greater intelligence and, potentially, highly disruptive capabilities. In the age of geotechnopolitics, human identity and human perceptions of our roles in the world will be distinctly different; monumental scientific discoveries will emerge in ways that humans may not be able to comprehend. Consequently, the AI development path that ultimately unfolds will matter enormously for the shape and contours of the future world (Pavel, et al., 2023).

“Although technology has often influenced geopolitics, the prospect of AI means that the technology itself could become a geopolitical actor. AI could have motives and objectives that differ considerably from those of governments and private companies. Humans' inability to comprehend how AI "thinks" and our limited understanding of the second- and third-order effects of our commands or requests of AI are also very troubling. Humans have enough trouble interacting with one another. It remains to be seen how we will manage our relationships with one or more AIs” (Pavel et al., 2023).

 The big question regarding AI is whether it will benefit the majority of humanity or further concentrate power and enhance inequality. 
 
Do not forget to read some other posts about the subject: 
 

• Diplomacy and Technology: The future is happening now (January 18, 2023) 
• Digital Diplomacy 4.0: The Future is Now (May 2, 2023) 
• Digital Diplomacy 4.0: Tech Diplomacy (May 8, 2023)
• Digital Diplomacy 4.0: The Basics of Artificial Intelligence (June 7, 2023)
• Digital Diplomacy 4.0: How Artificial Intelligence is Changing Diplomacy? (August 20, 2023)
• Diplomacy 4.0: The Rise of Artificial Intelligence as a Subject of Diplomatic Negotiations (November 20, 2023)

 
Besides, I have curated a list of resources on AI and Diplomacy, which is a work in progress: 

• Diplomacy 4.0: Resources on Diplomacy and Artificial Intelligence

 
References
 
Allen, G. (2022, October 11). Choking off China´s Access to the Future of AI. Center for Strategic & International Studies. 
Bremmer, I. & Kupchan, C. (2022, January 3). Risk 2: Technopolar World. Top Risks 2022. p. 5-6. Euroasian Group.
Cesareo, S. & White, J. (2023, June 23). The Global AI Index. Tortoise Media. 
Cuéllar, M.-F. & Sheehan, M. (2023, June 19). AI Is Winning the AI Race. Foreign Policy. 
Davies, H., Mckernan, B., and Sabbagh, D. (2023, December 1). ´The Gospel´: how Israel uses AI to select bombing targets in Gaza. The Guardian. 
Digwatch (n.d). GGE -Group of Governmental Experts- on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Digwatch.
Digwatch (2023, December 25). UN General Assembly adopted resolution on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems or LAWS. Digwatch.
DiploFoundation. (2019). Mapping the challenges and opportunities of artificial intelligence for the conduct of diplomacy. DiploFoundation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland.
Farrow, R. (2023, August 21). Elon Musk´s Shadow Rule. How the U.S. government came to rely on the tech billionaire—and is now struggling to rein him in. The New Yorker. 
Giles, K. (2023, September 12). Tech giants hold huge sway in matters of war, life and death. That should concern us all. The Guardian. 
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Liu, S. & Patton, D. (2023, December 22). China bans export of rare earths processing tech over national security. Reuters.
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Pavel, B., Ke, I., Spirtas, M., Ryseff, J., Sabbag, L., Smith, G., Scholl, K., & Lumpkin, D. (2022) AI and Geopolitics: How Might AI Affect the Rise and Fall of Nations? Rand Corporation. 
Sauer, P. (2023, Sept. 8). Elon Musk ´committed evil´ with Starlink order, says Ukrainian official. The Guardian.
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