This blog post is dedicated to all the Mexican diplomats and U.S. legal teams that work with death penalty cases involving Mexicans, especially in memoriam of Imanol de la Flor Patiño, an exemplary person. Today, twenty years ago, Mexico sued the United States in the International Court of Justice for violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), specifically Article 36, which provides the right of consular notification to foreign citizens detained abroad. The case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals against the United States was a milestone in Mexico's assistance to its citizen overseas, particularly in the United States. In March 2004, the Court rendered its judgment against the United States, thus becoming an instrumental decision for the consular protection of the rights of Mexicans arrested north of the border and also for the 52 named cases (Gómez Robledo 2005, p. 183). The Avena case is Mexico's most consequential consular protection case because it overhauled the assistance consulates provide to distressed citizens and raised the relevance of consular affairs inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Background In 1976, the United States Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty. In 1993, a Mexican was executed in Texas; he was the first Mexican put to death after the reimposition of capital punishment. His execution was a big issue in Mexico which generated "more than a hundred condemnatory articles in the [Mexican] press, and pronouncements by not only the minister of Foreign Affairs but the President [of Mexico]" (González de Cossío, 1995, p. 102). As a result, Mexico took a series of actions that helped prepare for the presentation of the Avena case in 2003. One immediate step was to interview all Mexicans on death row. As part of the process, consular officials identified a systemic violation of the right to consular notification in capital cases (González Félix, 2009, p. 218-220). In addition, in 1997, Mexico asked the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for an Advisory Opinion (OC-16/99) about the consular notification. It was a multilateral effort and was not bidding; thus, it was not a direct confrontation with the U.S. The Court published its opinion in 1999, stating that foreign individuals have certain rights under the VCCR, such as the rights of information, consular notification, and communications. Besides, it determined that the sending state and its consular officers also have the right to communicate with its detained nationals (Cárdenas Aravena, n.d). In 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico launched a new program to assist Mexicans on death row in the United States. This program complemented the legal training that some Mexican diplomats received as part of the official collaboration with the University of Houston that started in 1989 (see, for example, De la Flor Patiño, 2017 and number 109 of the Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior). Enhancing consular protection With the arrival of President Fox in 2000, Mexico's government stepped up its engagement with the Mexican community in the United States intending to enhance consular protection. Mexico started negotiating a bilateral migration agreement with the recently inaugurated U.S. president, George W. Bush. The government established the Presidential Office for Migrants Abroad, promoted the Mexican Consular ID Card, and created and expanded consular programs such as the Binational Health Week and the Ventanilla de Salud (Health Desk). In early 2002, the country ratified the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of the VCCR, to which the United States was also a party (González Félix, 2009, p. 221-222), thus offering a binding conflict resolution mechanisms. Meanwhile, the number of Mexicans sentenced to death and executed by U.S. authorities increased, creating an uproar in Mexico. In January 1995, there were 23 Mexicans sentenced to death in the U.S. (González de Cossío, 1995, p. 108). The ICJ's Avena Judgment decision of 2004 included 51 cases. From 1997 to 2002, four nationals were put to death in Texas and Virginia (Death Penalty Information Center, n/d). Even President Fox suspended a trip to president's Bush ranch in Texas in August 2002 as a protest of the execution of a Mexican in the same state (Gómez Robledo 2005, p. 178-179). Meanwhile, Paraguay in 1998 and Germany in 1999 requested the intervention of the ICJ regarding the Breard and LaGrand cases related to violations of consular notification rights by U.S. authorities. In Paraguay's case, the proceedings were stopped after the execution of its national in 1998, while the German brother's case continued even after both were put to death in 1999. Both instances were significant for Mexico's consular protection of its nationals on death row. According to Gómez Robledo (2005), after LaGrand's ICJ decision in June 2001, Mexico tried to work with the United States regarding the Mexicans sentenced to death whose rights were violated by local authorities by denying the consular access with no avail (p. 178-179). The Avena Judgment and its repercussions In January of 2003, in a bold action, Mexico presented in the ICJ the Avena case against the United States for violations of Article 36 of the VCCR regarding the death penalty cases of 54 Mexicans in the United States (Covarrubias Velasco, 2010, p. 133-134). The case had significant implications and had very high visibility in Mexico, particularly at a time when the migration to the United States grew very fast, passing from 4.3 million in 1990 to 9.1 million in 2000 (Rosenbloom & Batalova, 2022). After more than a year, which included one provisional measure, on March 31, 2004, the ICJ issued its judgment. In summary, "the ICJ concluded that the United States had violated its obligations under the Vienna Convention [on Consular Relations] by failing to properly notify Mexican nationals of their rights to have Mexican consular officials notified of their arrest, which in turn deprived Mexican consular officers of their right under Article 36 to render assistant to their detained nationals "(Garcia, 2004, p. 14). More significantly, "the Court ordered the United States to provide judicial review to each and every one of the fifty-one Mexicans named in the suit whose Article 36 rights had been violated, and to determine whether the failure to timely advise the consulate of their arrests resulted in "actual prejudice to the defendant." Importantly, the United States judiciary also had to review and reconsider the convictions and sentences as if the procedural default did not exist" (Kuykendall and Knight, 2018, p. 808-809). It was a massive victory for the rights of the Mexicans on death row, as it was mandatory for the U.S. government. The Judgment bound the U.S. to the 51 Mexicans with capital sentences, regardless of the eventual outcome of each case. The Avena case was a milestone for Mexico's consular protection because:
However, not all has been good news. Regarding the demand by the ICJ court that the U.S. review and reconsider the cases of the 51 Mexicans named in the Avena Judgment, the federal government has faced internal challenges. The most important of these was the Supreme Court's decision regarding the case of Medellin vs. Texas (p. 491). In 2008, the Court indicated that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is not a self-execution treaty, therefore, the U.S. Congress must legislate so it could become part of the U.S. law (Medellin vs. Texas (p. 491-492). Regardless of U.S. authorities' continuous breach of their international obligations, there have been crucial domestic adjustments. In some cases, State courts decided to review the death penalty cases based on the Avena Judgment and provided relief to Mexicans on death row. In addition, some states "have at least some statutory requirements concerning consular notification…[and] beginning in December 2014, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures now provide that at an initial appearance, the judge must inform the defendant" (Kuykendall and Knight, 2018, p. 824) that if they are foreigners, they have the right to contact their consulates. Besides, since the start of the Avena case in 2003, the support for the death penalty in the U.S. has been declining ever so slowly. In conclusion, the Avena case was Mexico's most consequential consular protection case, which enormously influenced the emergence of the country's public-consular diplomacy. References Cárdenas Aravena, C. (n.d). La Opinión Consultiva 16/99 de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y la Convención de Viena de Relaciones Consulares. Covarrubias Velasco, A. (2010). Cambio de siglo: la política exterior de la apertura económica y política. México y el mundo: Historia de sus relaciones exteriores. Tomo IX. El Colegio de México. Death Penalty Information Center, n.d. Execution of Foreign Nationals [in the United States. De la Flor Patiño, I. (2017). Pena de muerte en el condado de Harris, una mirada a través del cristal de la Universidad de Houston. Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior (109), 99-123. Gallardo Negrete, F. (2022, April 27). La pena de muerte en México, una historia constitucional. Este País. Garcia, M. J. (2004, May 17). Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Overview of U.S. Implementation and International Court of Justice (ICJ) Interpretation of Consular Notification Requirements. Congressional Research Service. Gómez Robledo V., J. M. (2005). El caso Avena y otros nacionales mexicanos (México c. Estados Unidos de América) ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia. Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional Vol. V, 173-220. https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/derecho-internacional/article/view/119/177 González Félix, M. A. (2009). Entrevistas: Pasajes Decisivos de la Diplomacia. El Caso Avena. Interview by C. M. Toro. Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior (86), 215-223. June. González de Cossío, F. (1995). Los mexicanos condenados a la pena de muerte en Estados Unidos: la labor de los consulados de México. Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior (46) 102-125. Spring. Kuykendall, G. & Knight, A. (2018). The Impact of Article 36 Violations on Mexicans in Capital Cases. Saint Louis University Law Journal 62(4), 805-824. Rosenbloom, R. & Batalova, J. (2022, Oct. 13). Mexican Immigrants in the United States. Migration Policy Institute. DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer or company.
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I am extremely happy to share with you the article Beyond Traditional Boundaries: The Origins and Features of the Public-Consular Diplomacy of Mexico, published in the newest edition of the Journal of Public Diplomacy. You can read it or download it in this link: https://www.journalofpd.com/_files/ugd/75feb6_82201616bab74db6b1f877c8deb734d6.pdf Besides, if you are interested in the origins of Mexico's consular diplomacy, you can read my previous post here. You can also read additional posts about consular diplomacy, such as:
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer or company. The following essay was one of the Public Diplomacy online course requirements offered by the DiploFoundation that I took in the Spring of 2013. I only made some editing for clarity and grammatical accuracy. Introduction Mexico has had a long tradition of cultural diplomacy, and more recently, tourism and investment promotion; however, it has not developed a comprehensive approach to Public Diplomacy (PD) in a sustained way. Besides certain times in its history, such as in the late 1890s, during the 1930s, and the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in early 1990s, the Government of Mexico has not tried to influence foreign publics as part of its foreign policy beyond conveying a positive image overseas. There are three reasons why: a) its foreign policy is based on the principle of non-intervention in other countries' affairs,[1] b) its foreign policy has mostly focused on Latin America, and c) its relationship with the United States.[2] Nonetheless, in recent years, as a result of the security crisis and the lack of significant progress in the domestic arena, the Government of Mexico is trying to implement a PD strategy to improve its image abroad and continue to be an influential member of the international community. This paper will briefly analyze Mexico's attempts to instrument certain aspects of Public Diplomacy, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. In addition, there are some recommendations on how Mexico could finally instrument a comprehensive long-term PD. Early efforts: investment promotion and cultural diplomacy. After decades of civil unrest and financial difficulties, Mexico experienced economic development in the last quarter of the 19th Century. As part of its foreign policy, the Government actively participated in World Fairs to convey a positive image abroad to attract investment and immigrants from Europe and Asia.[3] This period ended abruptly with the Mexican revolution in 1910, which hurt its economy and image abroad. After the revolution, in the late 1920s and 1930s, as part of Mexico's political realignment, the Government established significant cultural institutions and sponsored great works of art, including murals and other art forms, to legitimize the country's new regime. It engage in a forceful cultural diplomacy effort in South America. In the 1930s and 1940s, Mexico had a film bonanza, later followed by TV programs and music,[4] spreading Mexican culture all over Latin America, thus gaining international standing in those countries. In these two eras, Mexico had a concerted effort to gain international reputation and recognition to fulfill some of its foreign policy goals; however, these Public Diplomacy efforts were not sustained, except for an active but underfunded cultural diplomacy. The Cold War: inward-looking development and lack of promotion abroad. For most of the Cold War, Mexico had a reactive foreign policy, trying to avoid conflicts with the US and concentrating its diplomatic efforts in Latin America. However, in the 1960s and later, it became isolated as military dictatorships overtook democratic governments in the region, which were aligned with the US in the fight against communism. Nonetheless, Mexico continued to promote its cultural expressions abroad,[5] encouraged educational exchanges, and engaged in international cooperation as a donor. At the same time, the US media and entertainment industries became dominant in most of the world, which presented a distorted image of Mexico around the globe, even though the country was a success story in terms of economic development.[6] In an analysis of Mexico's image abroad, Simon Anholt indicated that the country had deeper problems than the current violence crisis. He mentioned that the country's image overseas had primarily been defined negatively, except in Latin America, by the US media and entertainment industries.[7] Post-Cold War: changes and missed opportunities With the end of the Cold War, Mexico's foreign policy experienced significant changes, being the most important one the negotiation of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Canada. It was one of the rare occasions when the Government of Mexico consciously tried to influence US public opinion. Through a series of activities, including major cultural exhibitions[8] in the US, including hiring professional lobbyists, it engaged directly with US businesses, labor unions, and environmental groups, with the support of their Mexican counterparts, in a coordinated effort to successfully approve the agreement.[9] As in the past, there was no continuity of these activities afterward. Moreover, when the economic crisis affected Mexico in 1995 (and the US offered a rescue package), there was no effort to mitigate the country's bad publicity and loss of reputation amongst the US and international public opinion. In 2000, when Mexico successfully had a democratic transition, the country regained international status; notwithstanding, the so-called "democratic bonus" was not cashed out because there were no major internal reforms. The country's brand stagnated versus the rapidly changing positions of nations such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. In 2006 a new administration took over and stepped up the combat against drug traffickers in Mexico. As a result, there was a considerable increase in violence, which became one of the few topics that the international media reported about the country, negatively impacting its image abroad.[10] According to the 2011 EastWest Global Index 200, Mexico occupied 192th place out of 200 nations, just above countries like Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, and Libya.[11] Recognizing that the country had an international image problem was an important step taken by President Calderon, even though it was long overdue. As a result, the Government created the "Marca País, Imagen de México" project[12] to show Mexico in a more balanced way and contextualize the violence stories. However, there were some problems with the project. It was coordinated by the Ministry of Tourism; therefore, its focus was mainly on tourism promotion rather than an overall Public Diplomacy strategy. In addition, it seldom coordinated its activities with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). A new administration, a new opportunity Thanks to the arrival of a new administration in December 2012, a slight reduction in violent acts in 2012, and the approval of significant reforms, the dynamic of Mexico's image abroad is changing;[13] therefore, it is an excellent opportunity to be seized by the new Government. Currently (2013), the Office of the Presidency, the MFA, the Ministries of Tourism and Trade, and ProMexico[14] hold bi-monthly meetings as part of an effort to improve Mexico's brand overseas. However, this interagency process is not a formal Public Diplomacy board that includes other actors, such as state and local authorities, businesses, universities, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations. In addition, it seems that the efforts of coordinating activities abroad are not incorporated in their respective actions and policies, thus limiting its implementation. Policy Recommendations. Considering that it seems there is confusion between Tourism Promotion/Cultural Diplomacy and PD, and there is a real need to try to engage foreign publics in order to counterbalance the bad image that is conveyed abroad, here are a few recommendations to instrument a genuine Public Diplomacy: a) Establish a formal Public Diplomacy Board, such as the one in France or the United Kingdom, that will be responsible for evaluating Mexico's current situation and propose a course of action with definite goals and activities to accomplish them. The Board should incorporate important non-state actors and local and state authorities. Inside the MFA, a Public Diplomacy office should be established to coordinate and instrument the decisions made by the Board. b) It would be wise to create a Public Diplomacy Handbook, such as the Australian one,[15] that not only explains what PD activities should be undertaken but provides advice in planning PD programs and showcases best practices. The publication of the handbook should be part of a training program for all government officials that deal with international activities. c) Teaching Spanish is a great tool to promote the country's culture and values and a deeper understanding of its idiosyncrasy. The new Government has proposed the creation of "Institutos Mexico"[16] as a way to promote the nation's culture and teach Spanish overseas. The establishment of Confucius centers by China worldwide in partnership with local universities could be used as a model.[17] d) Mexico's PD efforts should focus on specific countries that involve a comprehensive strategy that includes tourism and investment promotion, cultural exhibitions, people-to-people contacts, and educational exchanges. The effort should be made in the host country's language, so Mexico can "talk" directly to them, diminishing the use of English media and reaching a wider audience. The chosen countries should be regional leaders, such as the BRICS, Turkey, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, the UK, Spain, and Germany. e) The Government should take full advantage of Information Technologies to engage with foreign publics directly. Mexico should study the US embassy's experience in Indonesia, which had a very successful online presence, through the engagement of Indonesian bloggers and linking real-life events (such as President Obama's visit), with its online activities.[18] d) Mexico's MFA should fully incorporate to its PD strategy the activities of the Liaison Office with Civil Society Organizations,[19] the Institute of Mexicans Abroad,[20] and the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation.[21] These offices manage essential programs that have not been utilized to their full potential in the country's overall Public Diplomacy efforts. e) The Government should establish a research program focused on Public Diplomacy to further promote knowledge about this issue, emphasizing Mexico's circumstances. The "Observatorio Marca España" project at the Spanish Elcano Institute[22] is a good example that should be considered. Conclusions Even though Mexico had substantial experience in cultural diplomacy and, more recently, tourism and trade promotion, it has only engaged in Public Diplomacy in rare instances due to its foreign policy principles. The attention to the country's violence and its negative image abroad has renewed an effort to instrument a comprehensive Public Diplomacy strategy. In order to be successful, the Government has to have a long-term view, needs to improve its domestic situation, and requires investing sufficient funds in this endeavor. A key component for success is coordinating PD activities, collaborating with Non-State Actors, and better utilizing social media and information technology. Rodrigo Marquez Lartigue Public Diplomacy March 26th, 2013. [1] Luz Elena Banos Rivas, “Reflexiones sobre la diplomacia pública en México. Una mirada prospectiva” Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, No. 85, November 2008-February 2009, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. p. 154 [2] Pamela K. Starr, “Mexican Public Diplomacy: Hobbled by History, Interdependence, and Asymmetric Power” Public Diplomacy Magazine, University of Southern California Issue 2, Summer 2009 pp. 49-53. Available at http://publicdiplomacymagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/summer_2009.pdf [accessed March 15, 2013] [3] Roberta Lajous Vargas, Las relaciones exteriores de México (1821-2000), El Colegio de México, 2012, pp 128-129. [4] Andrés Ordoñez, “Diplomacia y cultura: Contenidos básicos para un reflexión pertinente”, Este País, June 3rd, 2012. Available at http://estepais.com/site/?p=38890 [accessed on March 24th, 2013] [5] This is the time that Mexico started to organized important exhibitions abroad, and created the office of cultural exchanges at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rafael Tovar y de Teresa, p. 192. [6] For example, it was the first developing nation to hold the Olympic Games in 1968, and two years later was the host of the World Cup. [7] Simon Anholt “Mito y realidad: la imagen internacional de México”, Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, No. 96, October 2012, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. p. 124 [8] Tovar y de Teresa, p. 188. [9] Starr, p. 51. [10] For a brief analysis of México’s media coverage in US newspapers see Guillermo Maynez Gil, “El Espejo roto: percepciones de México entre los extranjeros” Este País, No. 261, January 2013, pp. 8-12 [11] East West Communications, 2011 EastWest Global Index 200, Available at http://www.eastwestcoms.com/global.htm [accessed March 21st, 2013]. [12] To learn more about the project see Jaime Díaz and Mónica Pérez, “Marca México: una estrategia para reducir la brecha entre la percepción y la realidad”, Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, No. 96, October 2012, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. pp. 169-186. [13] Recently, there have been important reports about Mexico’s economic achievements in mayor news outlets such as the Financial Times, the New York Times and the Economist. [14] Mexico´s Export and Investment Promotion Agency. [15] Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Public diplomacy and advocacy handbook, August 2011. Available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/public-diplomacy-handbook/ [accessed 18 March 2013] [16] Mexico currently has 10 cultural centers: 4 in the USA (Miami, New York, San Antonio and Washington), 4 in Latin America (Belize, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Guatemala) and 2 in Europe (Spain and France). Cesar Guerrero, “La cultura en la imagen de México” Este País, January 2013, p. 21. [17] Zhe Ren, The Confucius Institutes and China´s Soft Power, Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, March 2012. Available at http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/1119/1/ARRIDE_Discussion_No.330_ren.pdf [accessed March 19, 2013] [18] Matthew Wallin, The Challenges of the Internet and Social Media in Public Diplomacy, American Security Project. February 2013. Pp. 9-10. Available at http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2013/the-challenges-of-the-internet-and-social-media-in-public-diplomacy/ [accessed March 20, 2012]. [19] The Liaison Office with Civil Society Organizations was created on January 8, 2009. For more information about the office in English see http://participacionsocial.sre.gob.mx/docs/dgvosc/brochure_sre_dgvosc.pdf [20] The Institute of Mexicans Abroad was created in 2003. For more information see http://www.ime.gob.mx/ [21] The Agency was created in 2011. For more information see http://amexcid.gob.mx/ [22] For more information visit http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3jjYB8fnxBnR19TE2e_kECjACdDAwjQ9_PIz03VL8h2VAQAidTU0Q!!/dl3/d3/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnZ3LzZfM1RER1FLRzEwT1BVMTBJUjQ3TjJVUzBDVjI!/ [accessed March 23, 2013] DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer or company This post was originally published February 4, 2021, by the CPD Blog at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy here uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/public-consular-diplomacy-its-best-case-mexican-consular-id-card-program. We look forward to sharing widely and hope you´ll do the same. The Mexican Consular ID card (MCID or Matrícula Consular) program is considered a successful public-consular diplomacy initiative. It resulted in significant benefits for the Mexican community living in the United States, creating long-lasting partnerships between Mexican consulates and local authorities, and financial institutions. With the focus on security in the U.S. after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Mexico's government decided to increase the security features of the MCID, which has been produced by the consulates since 1871. Consular offices started issuing the new high-security consular IDs cards in March 2002 while there were changes in banking regulations due to the USA Patriot Act of 2001. Besides the new security features, the Matrícula included additional information useful for local authorities and banks, such as the bearer's U.S. address. These added characteristics allowed banks, police departments and sheriffs' offices across the United States to appreciate it as a valuable tool and begin to recognize it as a form of ID. Despite pressure from anti-immigrant groups, the Treasury Department reaffirmed banks' possibility of accepting foreign government-issued identification documents, including the MCID, in September 2003. Wells Fargo was the first bank to accepted it and opened 400,000 bank accounts using the Matrícula from November 2001 to May 2004. Other financial institutions quickly followed. Therefore, by 2010, 400 financial institutions did the same, and 17 consulates signed 45 agreements with banks and credit unions. The Mexican Consular ID card was also seen as a step toward the financial inclusion of Latinos and immigrants; hence, the Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation (FDIC) promoted the collaboration with Mexico's consular network across the United States through the New Alliance Task Force. The benefit for the Mexican community was dramatic and very concrete. Having a bank account opened the door of financial inclusion. The Matrícula acceptance jumped dramatically in a short time. Consequently, as of July 2004, the Mexican Consular ID card “was accepted as valid identification in 377 cities, 163 counties, and 33 states…as well as…1,180 police departments…and 12 states recognize the card as one of the acceptable proofs of identity to obtain a driver's license.” After a hard pushback against issuing driver's licenses to undocumented migrants, some states reconsidered their position. “As of July 2015, 12 states…issued cards that give driving privileges...[to them]. Seven of these came on board in 2013.” Some states recognize the Matrícula as a form of identification for obtaining a driver's license, even as the implementation of the REAL ID Act of 2005 is finally moving forward. The search for the acceptance of the consular ID cards pushed consulates, for the first time as a large-scale operation, to reach out to potential partners, including banks, credit unions, city mayors, country supervisors, chiefs of police and sheriffs' officers across the U.S. They also met with local institutions such as libraries and utility companies to promote the benefits of the Matrícula Consular. It was a massive public-consular diplomacy initiative undertaken by the Mexican consular network across the United States. The focus was on advocacy, explaining the advantages of recognizing the MCIC as a form of identification for their institutions. It resulted in establishing a direct dialogue with thousands of authorities and financial institution officers, which in many cases developed into strategic alliances or at least meaningful collaborations. The benefit for the Mexican community was dramatic and very concrete. Having a bank account opened the door of financial inclusion, which includes being eligible for certain credits and loans, facilitating and reducing the cost of wiring money home, increasing the possibility to save and invest, and bypassing the usage of money lenders and wiring services to cash paychecks and sending money. Besides, having a form of identification also allowed them to come forward as witnesses of crimes, identify themselves to the police, access medical care, have greater participation in PTA meetings, and in some states, access to driver's licenses. For Mexico´s consulates, the Matrícula Consular opened the door for the collaboration with the Federal Reserve in the Directo a Mexico program, reduced the costs of remittances, and promoted its investment in their home communities, mainly through the 3x1 matching fund's program. As an outcome of the MCIC program's tremendous success, other countries followed with their own consular ID card programs. The Matrícula program experienced significant updates in 2006 and 2014. Today it continues to be a valuable resource for the Mexican community living in the United States. In 2019, 811,951 consular ID cards were issued by consular offices north of the border, with a monthly average of 67,663. The Mexican Consular ID card program is an excellent example of public-consular diplomacy, where Mexican consulates work toward establishing partnerships with local, county and state authorities to benefit the Mexican community. The program also showcases Mexico's successful consular diplomacy and the value of engaging with local and state stakeholders in its overall foreign policy. DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer or company. Opening note: I borrowed the idea of seen Mexico´s image from a broken mirror from Guillermo Máynez Gil´s article titled “El espejo roto: percepciones de México entre los extranjeros.”[i] I like the reference to a funhouse mirror because it reflects a person’s image but in a distorted way. So, the person can be identified but is presented in a very different way. In this post, I will argue that Mexico’s image abroad is distorted, like a reflection in a funhouse mirror, as a result of three circumstances: certain cultural expressions; U.S. influence in broadcasting to the world their own version of Mexico, and lack of policies and programs to projects its image overseas. Introduction. Every number of years, there is always a discussion about the need to improve Mexico´s image abroad, because according to Mexicans, it is skewed and does not reflect the country’s reality. As the reader saw in my post about these issues, a country´s image and reputation overseas is critical to its prosperity. Simon Anholt, creator of the terms Nation-brand, Competitive Identity, and the Good Country indicates that every country competes to get “a share of the world´s consumption and tourism, to attract investors, students, and business person, also to gain the respect of other governments, the international media and the people of other countries.”[ii] In this post, I will talk about Mexico´s image so the reader can better understand the different elements that influence how the country is perceived overseas and why it might have a bad international image. It is interesting to see that different authors such as Leonardo Curzio, Simon Anholt, Jaime Díaz, and Mónica Pérez, agree that there is a large gap between Mexico´s reality and the perceptions that most of the world has about the country, which in general is not favorable, with a few exceptions, mainly in the Americas. Anholt mentions that Mexico´s negative perception is so strong that it weighs down some of its best attributes, such as its cultural heritage and natural beauty. According to the 2010 Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brand Index, most of the persons surveyed in 20 nations see the country as less beautiful than Finland. It does not have more cultural heritage than Scotland, and it is less attractive as a tourist destination than Belgium.[iii] This is how much weight the perception and reputation can affect the country´s greatest attributes. Hence, the reputation of a country abroad is very relevant for its development and wellbeing. I divided this post into four sections: 1. Cultural expressions that are not-so-great-for-a-positive international reputation. 2. The consequences of somebody else projecting your country’s image. 3. Mexico´s lack of policies and tools to broadcast its own image abroad. 4. Final thoughts. But before moving on, let´s be honest. Mexico´s image and reputation outside Latin America are not good, and even quite bad, particularly amongst the U.S. public. Some of the most popular brand index positions Mexico in the bottom half, with few exceptions:
And in some, such as the Soft Power30, Mexico does not even make the list. 1. Cultural expressions that are not-so-great-for-a-positive international reputation. As mentioned before, Mexico´s image abroad is weak; however, there is a need to recognize that the international media is not to blame why foreign audiences have a “distorted” perception of Mexico that not corresponds to its reality as a G20 nation. Additionally, it is necessary to acknowledge that part of the problem is that Mexico has some cultural traits that probably are not conducive to be perceived in an upbeat fashion. Dr. Leonardo Curzio, a scholar that I much admire, in the article “La imagen de México”[v] explains in detail some of these cultural expressions that could hinder the country´s image abroad. Dr. Curzio ascertains that one of the best ways to reach out to foreign audiences is the country´s artistic and cultural output, especially through music. He pinpoints that Mexico´s traditional music is melancholic, nostalgic, or tragic.[vi] Thus, “Mexico has an image of a country that knows how to lament masterly, and that is what [Mexico] projects to the world.”[vii] Besides, Dr. Curzio also details that Mexico´s most famous monuments are several pyramids, not brand new buildings or infrastructure projects.[viii] Not even the Jumex and Soumaya museums' extraordinary designs or the award-winning and innovative Torre Reforma can compete with one of the new seven wonders of the world: the Mayan site in Chichén Itza, or the monumental city of Teotihuacán. Another cultural trait that might hold back the best of Mexico´s reputation, Curzio thinks, is that its national heroes are linked to tumultuous times. Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa are the country´s leaders with the most prominent international projection.[ix] Besides, Mexico´s great heroes are not institution-builders but liberators that can starts movement but struggle to finish them.[x] Dr. Curzio indicates that in the construction of the image of Mexico, stability is overshadowed by turbulence. Also, Mexico broadcasts a picture of an unjust country with sporadic revolutionary violence.[xi] Curzio adds that “the violence associated with [Mexico´s] history is complemented by [its] artistic expressions, which a lot of them have a systematic and persistent death cult.”[xii] He exemplifies this by citing José Guadalupe Posada or Frida Kahlo’s works, present in all tourist stores and museums of Mexico. For a current example, the reader can participate in a virtual tour of the exhibition “La Muerte en la Historia de México” (The death in Mexico´s history) at the Museo Nacional de la Muerte, which I did not it existed in Aguascalientes until now. Every day the celebration of the “Day of the dead,” a UNESCO´s Intangible Cultural Heritage, is gaining popularity abroad, including the opening scene of James Bond´s movie Spectre or the award-winning Disney movie “Coco.” Besides, for a very long time, Mexican Cultural Diplomacy has focused on the exhibition of our significant pre-hispanic cultural heritage and our muralist movement. Until recently, alive Mexican artists like Gabriel Orozco or Damián Ortega have international recognition beyond the artistic circles. In conclusion, while strong, Mexico has some cultural expressions that do not help portray an image of a modern and innovative nation. Some of these expressions are well-known overseas and tend to eclipse other attributes that could be more attractive or perceived more positively by foreign publics. 2. The consequences of somebody else projecting your country’s image. In a very stimulating article titled “Mito y realidad: la imagen internacional de Mexico,”[xiii] Simon Anholt elucidates why Mexico has such a wide gap between its reality and how the world perceives it. He identifies as one fundamental issue that Mexico´s image abroad has partially been shaped, not by its own work but through U.S. lenses. I think it is troublesome for two reasons: a) The U.S. national identity had partially developed in contrast to Mexico, even before the two nations were created: WASP tradition vs. contra-reformation Catholic and indigenous heritage. Therefore, for the U.S., Mexico and its population have always represented the “other.” This perception is compounded by millions of Mexicans living north of the border, mostly from rural areas and with little education. So there is an intrinsic confrontation between the two, and as Leonardo Curzio explains, Mexico has not been able to transform what unites the two countries into a regional identity.[xiv] Maybe this could be the main reason. b) U.S. broadcast and entertainment industries have dominated the world airwaves and now the internet. So, the images of Mexico portrayed by these companies are not neutral and have an underlying intent related to showcasing its “otherness” to the U.S. public. Additionally, in specific periods, there were propaganda campaigns organized by U.S authorities, media, and broadcasting businesses to harm Mexico´s image, such as during its revolution and in the intra-wars years. A weak neighbor is better than a strong one. Dr. Curzio indicates that “in the construction of mutual images between Mexico and the United States, the former historically has received the worse part.”[xv] So, Mexico has a quite complicated situation as a neighbor of the U.S, which has the strongest voice in the world. Now I understand why a citizen of Africa or Asia thinks that “Taco Bell” is authentic Mexican cuisine, the country is made up only of drylands and deserts, or that its population is lazy. These are the images that the U.S. entertainment industry has transmitted over and over to everybody. An example of Mexico being portrayed by the U.S. entertainment industry is the Disney movie “Coco,” created by a U.S. citizen. Another one is Cirque du Soleil´s Luzia spectacle.[xvi] So, even as beautiful as they are, the images they project of Mexico are like a funhouse mirror. To make matters worse, Mexico, with a few exceptions, has not been able to implement a long-term communications strategy to counterbalance U.S. images of the country, as the reader will see in the next section. Simon Anholt expresses surprise by the U.S and Canada’s opinion of Mexico as one of the world’s pariahs. He describes this perception as contempt by the two populations with substantial economic, social, cultural, and political connections.[xvii] He speculates that a reevaluation of Mexico´s image by the U.S. population is only possible if the country obtains tangible benefits of its position in the world, similar to what happened with Ireland in the case of Great Britain.[xviii] 3. Mexico´s lack of policies and tools to broadcast its own image overseas. Even though the international media portraits Mexico as a violent, traditional country, there has been a lack of serious efforts to change this situation. As the reader will learn, there were some but very limited. Simon Anholt and Leonardo Curzio coincide that Mexico needs to have a policy to really affect its reputation. However, by looking at the article published by coordinators of Mexico´s Nation-Brand project from 2010 to 2012,[xix] it seems that the effort was mainly focused on tourism, and its measurements were limited to marketing “impacts” rather than as a decisive step forward toward a better reputation. Dr. Curzio, in his seminal book Orgullo y Prejuicios: Reputación e imagen de México identifies three major problems of Mexico´s image:
As a solution to these challenges, Curzio suggests the need for developing three elements: substance, narrative, and appropriate communications channels.[xxiii] He indicates that except for the 1968 Olympic Games[xxiv] and NAFTA´s promotion in 1993, [xxv] the country has not developed a systematic activity to show contents that defy the stereotypes defined by the entertainment industry. Besides, it has not invested the necessary time, money, and talent to create TV and movie characters that portray a Mexican as loyal and trustworthy.[xxvi] Similarly, Anholt indicates that Mexico´s relative silence after NAFTA’s approval has not helped compensate for its image´s weakness. Neither the insufficient investments in tourism, trade and investment promotion as well as in cultural diplomacy in proportion to its monumental cultural heritage.[xxvii] The country does not have an international broadcasting program, where it can present its views to the world in addition to its cultural traditions and its modern side. Dr. Curzio calls these “appropriate channels of communication.” However, he indicates that the targeted audience has to be defined before identifying these communication conduits. [xxviii] Anholt indicates that the lack of institutions that assist in promoting Mexico's image, such as international cultural institutes or public diplomacy networks, could be an advantage because it is more difficult to change organizations that already exist than establishing new from scratch.[xxix] Curzio indicates that it is a paradox that the country has some giant entertainment companies with vast outreach, such as Televisa; however, the country does not have any channel to projects its image. And it also lacks in the production of content that could be interesting for foreign audiences.[xxx] On the bright side, as Guillermo Máynez Gil discovers in his article “El espejo roto: percepciones de México entre los extranjeros.”[xxxi] Mexico is like a broken mirror, and each fractured piece portraits a different image according to the viewer’s perspective. Therefore, for an epicurean, Mexico is a wildly delicious country to feast on; for biologists, anthropologists, and archeologists, the nation is paradise and refuge for U.S and Canadian snowbirds.[xxxii] Máynez Gil explains that the number of foreigners living in Mexico is an example of its attractiveness, considering the cost of living and quality.[xxxiii] However, to be honest, comparatively with other nations, the number of foreigners living in Mexico is low. 4. Final thoughts. So if we combined Mexico´s not-so-great-for-a-good-reputation cultural expressions, and a very solid but outdated image abroad, together with the U.S broadcast of its perception of Mexico and lack of a long-term strategy, it does not surprise the low esteem that the country has abroad, particularly beyond the Americas. As seen in this post, Mexico´s image has some challenges that need to be overcome to be regarded by the world´s population as a positive and strong nation. It has to transform the broken funhouse mirror into a regular one, so it is appreciated as it really is. Simon Anholt´s idea of the Good Country, or how countries' images are related to what the nation contributes for the wellbeing of the planet, not just its citizens, could be a way forward for Mexico to change its reputation overseas. [i] Máynez Gil, Guillermo, “El espejo roto: percepción de México entre los extranjeros” in Este País, №261, January 2013, pp. 8–12 [ii] Anholt, Simon, “Mito y realidad: la imagen internacional de México” in Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, №96, October 2012, p. 111 [iii] Anholt, Simon, 2012, p. 118. [iv] This might seem old or outdated, but was the last issue of its type and is relevant because the countries are ranked “based on how are described in major media.” East West Global Index 200, 2011. It was also a year that was not great for Mexico in global news. [v] Curzio, Leonardo, “La imagen de México” in La Política Exterior de México: Metas y obstáculos, Guadalupe González G and Olga Pellicer (coords.), México, Siglo XXI Editores, 2013, pp. 27–50. [vi] Curzio, 2013, p. 36 [vii] Ibid, 2013, p. 36. [viii] Ibid, 2013, p. 37. [ix] Ibid, 2013, p. 37. [x] Ibid. 2013, p. 38. [xi] Ibid, 2013, p. 38. [xii] Ibid, 2013, p. 38. [xiii] Anholt, Simon, “Mito y realidad: la imagen internacional de México” in Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, №96, October 2012, pp. 109–130. [xiv] Curzio, Leonardo, Orgullo y Prejuicios: Reputación e imagen de México, México, UNAM-CISEN Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2016, p. 23–25. [xv] Curzio, 2016, p. 23. Dr. Curzio reaches this conclusion after reviewing the following study: Terrazas y Basante, Marcela, Gurza Lavalle, Gerardo, de los Ríos, Patricia, Riguzzi, Paolo. Las relaciones México — Estados Unidos 1756–2010, 2 vols. Mexico, Insitutio de Investigaciones Históricas, CISEN-UNAM, SRE, 2012. [xvi] Cirque du Soleil is a Canadian company, with very strong ties to the U.S. For a brief description of Luzia as conduit of Mexico´s image, see Carrera, Felipe, “”Luzia,” a Creative and Innovative Cultural Intervention”, Center for Public Diplomacy Blog, October 8, 2018. Also see, Hernández, Daniel,·”´Luzia´is Cirque de Soleil´s valentine to Mexico”, The Frame, January 31, 2018, and “Beyond Tacos and Burritos: How Circus show and Movie Coco influence the country image of Mexico”, Place Brand Observer, February 15, 2018. [xvii] Anholt, 2012, p. 119. [xviii] Anholt, 2012, p. 126. [xix] Díaz, Jaime and Pérez, Mónica “Marca México: una estrategia para reducir la brecha entre la percepción y la realidad” in Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, №96, October 2012, pp. 169–186. [xx] Curzio, 2016, p. 15. [xxi] Curzio, 2016, p. 16. [xxii] Curzio, 2016, p. 22. [xxiii] Curzio, 2016, p. 22. [xxiv] In recent years, there has been new research about the cultural diplomacy effort during the Olympics Games, also known as Cultural Olympics. See, Castañeda, Luis M., Spectacular Mexico: Design, propaganda and the 1968 Olympics, 2014; Witherspoon, Kevin, Before the Eyes of the World: Mexico and the 1968 Olympic Games, 2014; and México: la Olimpiada Cultural. [xxv] To learn more about Mexico´s public diplomacy initiatives regarding the approval of NAFTA see, Villanueva, César, Representing Cultural Diplomacy: Soft Power, Cosmopolitan Constructivism and Nation Branding in Mexico and Sweden, Sweden, 2007; Villanueva, César, “Cooperación y diplomacia cultural: experiencias y travesías. Entrevista al embajador Jorge Alberto Lozoya” in Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, №85, February 2009, pp. 253–267; and Starr, Pamela K., “Mexican Public Diplomacy: Hobbled by History, Interdependence and Asymmetric Power” in Public Diplomacy Magazine, №2, Summer 2009, pp. 49–53. [xxvi] Curzio, 2016, 25. [xxvii] Anholt, 2012, p. 124–125. [xxviii] Curzio, 2016, p. 22. [xxix] Anholt, 2012, p. 128. [xxx] Curzio, 2016, p. 16–17. [xxxi] Máynez Gil, Guillermo, “El espejo roto: percepción de México entre los extranjeros” in Este País, №261, January 2013, pp. 8–12 [xxxii] Máynez Gil, 2013, p. 10. [xxxiii] Máynez Gil, 2013, p. 11–12. DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer or company. There are only two more chapters to review of the book Mexican Consular Diplomacy in Trump´s Era, so today, I will comment on the essay written by Ambassador José Octavio Tripp titled “Mexican Consular Diplomacy and the risks of administrative hydrocephalus.” The chapter´s main point is that Mexico´s Consular Diplomacy's success in the United States has the risk of demanding too much from the consular network, developing hydrocephalus. He describes how, through the years, the consulates ´responsibilities have nearly fourth-fold, without the same amount of additional resources. As the reader will learn, this essay is the perfect description of the consular affairs modernization process that most countries have undertaken in the second part of the 20th century referred to in the work of Maaike Okano-Heijmans and Jan Melissen titled Foreign Ministries and the Rising Challenge of Consular Affairs: Cinderella in the Limelight. Additionally, it closely follows the definition of Consular Diplomacy presented by Maaike Okano-Heijmans, a scholar of the Clingendael Institute, in the paper “Change in Consular Assistance and the Emergence of Consular Diplomacy”. In his essay, Ambassador Tripp explains that the consulates could suffer from abnormal and harmful growth, similar to a brains´ hydrocephalus if they continue to expand their obligations.[i] He proposes developing a plan that evaluates what works and what does not, focusing on Mexico's foreign policy goals. In the section titled “Genesis”, Tripp explains that September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks are the origin of Mexico's Consular Diplomacy. It resulted from the end of the circular migration of Mexican due to growing immigration enforcement at the border and in the interior of the U.S.[ii] He discusses the efforts taken by the government of Mexico in its Consular ID card program, indicating that was the iconic activity of Mexico´s Consular Diplomacy at that time.[iii] Interestingly, Tripp includes a definition of Consular Diplomacy from the then Undersecretary for North America, Sergio M. Alcocer Martínez de Castro, in the introduction to the volume dedicated to Consular Diplomacy of the Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior: “public policy, that besides dealing with the traditional tasks of documentation services and protection to citizens, explores new action areas, such as the promotion of Mexico´s economic and technological interest, with the double purpose to empower Mexicans abroad and promote the national interest.”[iv] However, the Ambassador indicates that this definition is insufficient because it did not include some of its elements, such as communitarian activism and consular political-administrative management.[v] In the second part of the chapter, Tripp describes the growing consular responsibilities from the 1990s onward, indicating that they have jumped from seven traditional duties to nearly 50 overall.[vi] The Ambassador explains the development of new consular responsibilities in three major areas:
Tripp emphasizes that this list did not include all the administrative responsibilities that, even though they are not classified as services, they utilize the consulates´ limited time and resources.[viii] Afterward, he briefly describes some of the new tasks that the consulates have to perform, as seen in Figure 1 at the bottom of the post. As the consulates' duties grew, the Ambassador explains, so the media's attention to Consular Affairs. So, in a high visibility case, the consul has to deal not only with local authorities but also with multiple Mexican actors.[ix] The Ambassador identifies two essential characteristics of Mexico´s Consular Diplomacy:
Tripp identifies positive and negative consequences of the transformation of the Mexican Consular Diplomacy:
The expansion of Mexico´s international reputation, together with offering unique services to its Diaspora, indicates that Consular Diplomacy will continue to develop in the future. However, the Ambassador warns about the risks of excessively burdensome consular work.[xiii] Tripp states that it is imperative to develop a comprehensive plan that establishes the priorities and delineates its limits, so Mexico´s Consular Diplomacy can be sustainable in the long run. It is essential to limit its growth and eliminate no-priority tasks.[xiv] As part of the planning process, the Ambassador includes the need to define the consulate´s vocation or niche. For example, he distinguishes a border consulate's priorities from one located in a high tech or research region. Furthermore, he indicates the necessity of having a flexible evaluation process that focuses on the consulate's efficiencies of its main tasks.[xv] The chapter is a valuable contribution because it shows the impressive growth of consular duties and its risks. It also describes the greater weight of consular affairs in Mexico´s foreign policy and the growing interests of the media and politicians. Besides, Tripp proposes developing a plan that eliminates non-fundamental tasks and seeks to limit citizen´s expectations of consular protection and services. The Ambassador indicates that Mexico increased its reputation, not only amongst Mexicans but internationally, so he found a new source of soft power and a tool for nation-branding. Additionally, implicitly, he states other Mexican authorities' interest to have an international presence or expand its programs to cater to Mexicans abroad. Interestingly enough, the consulates have responded to the augmentation of its responsibilities successfully, although, as the Ambassador commented, it might distract resources from their fundamental obligations. I believe that they have done that efficaciously by expanding the partnerships with local and state allies. [i] Tripp, José Octavio, “La diplomacia consular mexicana y los riesgos de la hidrocefalia administrativa” en La Diplomacia Consular Mexicana en Tiempos de Trump, 2018, p. 217. [ii] Ibid. p. 218. [iii] Ibid. p. 219. [iv] Ibid. p. 219. [v] Ibid. p. 219. [vi] Ibid. p. 220. [vii] Ibid. p. 220. [viii] Ibid. p. 220. [ix] Ibid. p. 226. [x] Ibid. p. 226-227. [xi] Ibid. p. 227. [xii] Ibid. p. 228. [xiii] Ibid. p. 227. [xiv] Ibid. p. 228. [xv] Ibid. p. 228-229. DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer or company. In this chapter of the book, Vanessa Calva Ruiz explains one of Mexico´s Public Diplomacy strategies implemented in the United States: Developing partnerships with allies and its community based on shared ideas and interactive dialogue. However, she does not use the term “Public Diplomacy” explicitly in her text. Calva Ruiz identifies the establishment of a new model of consular care as a catalysis for the expansion of networks with non-traditional groups and organizations, such as the Jewish community and LGBT associations.[i] She also indicates that the consular care new model derives from the Human Rights Constitutional amendment of 2011 that adopted the “pro-persona” principle. The new model is grounded on dialogue and trust between the Mexican community and the consular network.[ii] This new consular care model has resulted in identifying additional needs of the Mexican community, thus pushing forward the development of new partnerships, including novel allies. Calva Ruiz explains that Mexico has a reliable consular administration in the U.S. However, each of the 51 Mexican consulates operates in a unique form, considering the specific circumstances of its location and the Mexican community's characteristics.[iii] I believe this characteristic is essential due to the size and complexity of the United States' political landscape. Additionally, she describes the trípode consular or consular tripod, which comprises of the activities and programs of the three areas of consular assistance: protection to citizens, documentary services, and community affairs. The three interact to provide better services and also empower the Mexican community.[iv] As an example of the trípode consular, she presents the Ventanilla de Atención Integral para la Mujer or the “Initiative for the Comprehensive Care of Women” (VAIM) that interconnects all areas of the consulates to offer specialized assistant to Mexican women. Besides, it promotes training and sensibilization about their challenges and created a resources and services directory.[v] The expansion of the VAIM in 2016 pushed the consulates to be proactive in developing alliances with new stakeholders. Traditionally, consular offices have extended collaboration with Latino organizations, civil rights groups, and Hometown Association.[vi] But in recent years, the search for new partners. She offers as an example the activities that were developed with LGBT national associations, such as Human Rights Campaign, GLAAD, and GLSEN in the United States together with Mexico´s Consejo Nacional para la Prevención de la Discriminación (CONAPRED) and Supreme Court of Justice.[vii] As a result, consulates created “safe zones”, participated in training sessions, information campaigns, Pride and Spirit days celebrations,[viii] not only in the U.S. but also in embassies and consulates worldwide. Check out the excellent video produce by the Ministry for Spirit Day 2017 at the bottom of this post. As part of the new consular care model, Calva Ruiz also includes the use of new technologies, and describes the creation of the Centro de Información y Atención a Mexicanos (consular protection calling center) and the MiConsulmex smartphone app.[ix] I think that another example of specialized consular assistance to specific vulnerable groups is the development of three consular care protocols: -Unaccompanied migrant children and adolescents, created with the support of UNICEF Mexico.[x] -Victims of gender-based violence, with UN Women. -Victims of human trafficking, with the International Organization for Migration. Vanessa Calva Ruiz concludes that “the establishment of partnerships not only takes care of urgent needs of the Mexican community but also assist them in integrating to the host society by linking them with local actors that offer resources.”[xi] In her chapter, Calva Ruiz cites an article that she wrote and was published in The Hill newspaper, highlighting Consular Diplomacy activities in favor of the Mexican LGBT communities. You can read the articles here. “Consular Diplomacy and LGBT rights, lessons from Mexico.” This paper is worth reading because it highlights how Mexico´s Consular Diplomacy has expanded with the establishment of non-traditional allies, such as LGBT national organizations, that provide services to the Mexican community and help them integrate. To see some of inclusive flyers visit https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/475074/Infograf_as_Incluyentes_-_INGL_S_-2019.pdf [i] Calva Ruiz, Vanessa, “Diplomacia Consular y acercamiento con socios estratégicos” in La Diplomacia Consular Mexicana en tiempos de Trump, 2018, p. 210. [ii] Ibid. p. 206. [iii] Ibid. p. 205. [iv] Ibid. p. 208. [v] Ibid. p. 208-209. [vi] Hometown Associations or Clubes de Oriundos are community-based organizations that bring together persons from the same location. Normally, they support the organization of traditional festivities in their hometowns. [vii] Ibid. p. 211. [viii] See for example Arelis Quezada, Janet, “Consulados y embajada de México participan en #SpiritDay Mexican Consulates and Embassy participates in #SpiritDay”, GLAAD website, October 16, 2017. [ix] Ibid. p. 213-214. [x] For a brief description of the protocol´s origins and its benefits, see Gallo, Karla, “En el camino hacia la protección integral de la niñez migrante, UNICEF México Blog, August 21, 2019. [xi] Ibid. p. 215. DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer or company. A few days ago, Mexico celebrated the tenth anniversary of its traditional cuisine as an Intangible Cultural Heritage by UNESCO. I believe it is an important milestone as it was the first cuisine included in the registry. The other two registries had a different perspective, the French meal emphasizes processes, while the Mediterranean diet focuses on ingredients, according to Gloria López Morales,[i] Founder and President of the Conservatorio de la Cultura Gastronómica Mexicana, a non-profit organization registered at the UNESCO. To learn more about Mexico´s Gastrodiplomacy efforts to achieve this goal, check out the post More than Tacos: Mexico´s scrumptious, yet unknown Gastrodiplomacy. So, what has happened in the last ten years? There are three significant developments since then: 1. Internally, the inclusion of our traditional cuisine in the UNESCO registry has given us an enhanced sense of pride. We always thought our food was great, but this was its international validation. Besides, it also created a revolution in our food scene; suddenly, some of our top chefs, such as Enrique Olvera and Jorge Vallejo, became international figures and were listed in the 50 Best Restaurant lists, climbing almost to the top.[ii] The recognition also makes them part of several documentaries such as Netflix´s Chef´s Table, or even their own shows such as Gabriela Camara`s Netflix show Una historia de dos cocinas, about Contramar restaurant in Mexico City and its sister in San Francisco. More importantly, our traditional cuisine had the attention of not only sociologists, food experts, and chefs but authorities and the general public. The rise of the Cocineras Tradicionales[iii] or Traditional female cooks and all the events that were built around their expertise is just remarkable. Part of the registration on the UNESCO´s list is to protect the heritage, so, in this case, the traditional cuisine was not just protected but was reappraised and revitalized. For example, there have been yearly national conferences for cocineras tradicionales, and also at the state level. They are also participating in international meetings and tours, such as one in Southern France in late 2019. It also helped in the regional cuisine phenomenon, which helps maintain the unique cuisines of regions and small towns across Mexico. Mexico's report about its efforts regarding this registry is due before the end of 2020, so it will be interesting to read it when it is published. 2. Externally, it helped in the promotion of Mexico as a tourist destination. In many promotional materials and ad campaigns, there were the reference of Mexican food as Intangible Cultural Heritage and the Cocineras Tradicionales. 3. Regarding UNESCO´s Intangible Cultural Heritage registry, it was the Campeche meeting in 2008 that generated enough momentum for the world to look at cuisine as a cultural heritage.[iv] Now, 26 countries have 18 “food preparation” elements in the registry.[v] Even after achieving the ultimate goal of the registry, Mexico has continued to embrace some Gastrodiplomacy strategies. The Institute of Mexicans Abroad continued to promote Mexican gastronomy after some of the programs came to an end in 2012, like supporting the Foro Mundial de la Gastronomia Mexicana. The forum has taken place six times since 2013. The one in 2018 took place in the United States under the titled “Viva la Comida Mexicana en Norteamérica,” and its objectives was to: “Strengthen the development of Mexican cuisine abroad through education, commercial expansion, and promotion of the entire value chain that constitutes the national and regional gastronomic heritage. To give continuity to the projects of support to the traditional cooks as carriers of the Gastronomic Patrimony of the country.”[vi] Additionally, in 2016 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs embarked on Gastrodiplomacy across the world with the designation of “Chefs Diplomatic corps” or Cuerpo Diplomático de Cocineros and the Young Talent internships in 12 embassies and consulates, as part of the “Ven a Comer” initiative launched the same year. So, let´s eat some traditional Mexican food as part of the celebration. Provecho!! [i] García Ocejo Mercedes, “Cómo la UNESCO designó a la gastronomía mexicana Patrimonio de la Humanidad” in El Heraldo de México, March 22, 2020. [ii] In the 2019 list, Olvera´s restaurant Pujol was number 12 and Cosme 23, while Jorge Vallejos´ Quintonil occupied the 24th position. [iii] The Cocineras tradicionales or traditional female cooks represent the traditional Mexican cuisine because most of them inherited the knowledge from their ancestors and carry on this heritage. For an interesting review of their role, see Matta, Raúl, “Mexico´s culinary heritage and cocineras traditionales (traditional female cooks)” in Food and Foodways, Vol. 27, Num. 3, 2019, p 211-231. [iv] Romagnoli, Marco “Gastronomic heritage elements at UNESCO: problems, reflections and intepretations of a new heritage category” in International Journal of Intangible Heritage, Vol 14, 2019, p. 165. [v] See UNESCO ´s ¨food preparation” category of the registry in the following link https://ich.unesco.org/en/lists?term[]=vocabulary_thesaurus-10 [vi] VI Foro Mundial de Gastronomía Mexicana website, “About Us, Objectives”, 2018. DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer or company. After reviewing the TRICAMEX consular coordination program developed in South Texas, and discussing the Transborder Consular Diplomacy experience of CaliBaja between Southern California and Baja California, I think is advisable to examine the chapter written by Ambassador Carlos González Gutiérrez titled “The meaning of a special relation: Mexico´s relationship with Texas in the light of California´s experience”. Ambassador González Gutiérrez had a first-hand experience of the differences between the two giants. He was the Consul General of Mexico in Sacramento, California, and later in Austin, Texas, the two States' capitals. It is not an exaggeration to say that what happens in the Golden State and the Lone Star State has a similar impact on Mexico and its community in the U.S. as the bilateral relationship in Washington and Mexico City. These two heavy-weights were once part of Mexico, as I mentioned in my post about the Origins of Mexico´s Consular Diplomacy. For most of history, they had comparable approaches to Mexico and the Mexican community living there. However, in the 1990s, while Texas had a pragmatical approach, California´s electorate approved the ballot initiative Proposition 187 in 1994. Both States coincided in 2001, as the two enacted legislation to offer in-state tuition to undocumented persons who graduated from local high schools. But, as the reader will see in the chapter´s review, from there, their positions about immigration issues have significantly diverged. While the Golden State has promoted welcoming immigration policies, the Lone Star State has become the spearhead of the anti-immigrant movement in the U.S. Before moving forward, there is an important caveat that applies across the United States. Even though each State´s policies and the society´s attitudes towards immigrants are very different, not all is black or white, but many shades of gray, or I should say red and blue. Rural and ex-suburbs areas of the Golden State have the same negative sentiments towards immigrants as in any part of the Lone Star State. However, Texan cities such as Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio, and even border towns as El Paso and Brownsville are as welcoming to foreigners, particularly Mexicans, as California as a whole. You just have to see a county electoral map in both states to understand this situation. Figure 1 includes a comparative chart of some of the differences between the two States mentioned by Ambassador González Gutiérrez in his chapter, which will help comprehend better the situation in both States. So, let´s start with the review.
The Ambassador declares that his essay's objective is to explore the relationship between Mexico and Texas in trade and migration while comparing it with California´s links with Mexico. He also analyzes the short and long-term perspectives of the Mexican Consular Diplomacy in Texas.[i] While describing the similarities and differences of Mexico's relationships and the Golden and the Lone Star States, González Gutiérrez pinpoints the origins of the very different roads that both states have taken regarding immigration. The Ambassador indicates that “if the Latino electorate in Texas were as relevant as is in California, it is less likely that Texas would promote with the same vigor a restrictive agenda regarding immigration.”[ii] As the reader will learn, the chapter is a vital contribution to understanding different paths that both States have taken concerning their immigrant communities. The Ambassador uncovers Texas´ disassociation between the reality of the migrants' relevance to the States´ prosperity and its anti-immigrant discourse and policies.[iii] González Gutiérrez substantiates comparing Mexico´s relationship with California and Texas because they are the two largest States, and both have the closest links to our country. Besides, the two represent the opposites of the U.S. ideological spectrum and reveal very different political cultures.[iv] The Ambassador implies that California and Texas´s different immigration paths resulted from a significant increase of Hispanics in Texas (60.4%), compared to California (38.9%) from 2000 to 2015.[v] The changes in foreign-born were also dissimilar. From 1990 to 2000, the foreign-born population grew by 37.2% in the Golden State, while from 2000 to 2018, only 19.9%. The numbers are superior in the Lone Star State, so from 1990 to 2000, it increased by 90% and 2000-2018 by 70%.[vi] I think there was a similar growth of anti-immigrant attitudes in places where new immigrants arrived recently. Additionally, from 2009 to 2014, as a result of the economic crisis, the number of undocumented Mexicans fell 190,000 in the Golden State while the numbers remained the same in the Lone Star State.[vii] Afterward, González Gutiérrez describes how California and Texas responded to immigration challenges. He starts explaining that in 2001 the two legislatures approved in-state tuition for undocumented youth. For the Golden State was the beginning of several pro-immigrant bills, while in Texas, it was outlier legislation and soon turned into the anti-immigrant field.[viii] While California inaugurated the era of anti-immigrant policies with Proposition 187 in 1994, later on, after taking over the control of the legislature and the governor´s office, the State embarked on an integrative agenda for migrants, enacting several laws, such as;
Meanwhile, from a practical perspective on immigration with then-governor George W. Bush, Texas became the anti-immigrant movement forerunner in the United States with Governor Greg Abbott and the enactment of the SB4 law in 2017.[x] The Ambassador explains that this movement resulted from the total control that the Republican party has of the State´s government and the need for getting the support of hard-core primary voters.[xi] He pinpoints the move to a more radical position as a result of Governor Perry´s presidential aspirations. He was the one that first sent Texan Rangers to guard the border, arguing the failure to do so by the federal (Obama) government.[xii] In the section titled “A special relationship with Mexico?”, González Gutiérrez tries to explain Texas´ contradictory position about its southern neighbor, considering that it has a very close trade and economic relation while implementing anti-immigrant policies directed mainly against Mexicans.[xiii]- As previously mentioned, he elucidates that the elections occur in the primaries. Politicians prefer short-term gains for their support, even if this means alienating part of the Latino community or against the State´s economic interests.[xiv] The Ambassador does not think that Texas will follow California on immigration issues because labor unions in the Lone Star State are not as strong as the Golden State. Also, the political distance between the two parties in California was narrower than the one in Texas.[xv] Besides, both States' political cultures are very different, and “it would be a mistake to assume that Latinos in the two are ideological alike just because they have the same ethnicity.”[xvi] In the last part of the chapter, the Ambassador evaluates Mexico´s Consular Diplomacy in Texas. He explains that the eleven consulates of Mexico in Texas have to deal with a “cognitive dissonance”, between the excellent trade partnership and its “Mexican bashing”.[xvii] González Gutiérrez depicts the Texan business sector's effort thru the Texas Mexico Trade Coalition to defend NAFTA, while State politicians remained on the sidelines for a while. It was not until the Coalition lobbied them when they publicly supported free trade with Mexico and Canada.[xviii] He asserts that Texas's special relation is limited and has not crossed over to additional bilateral concerns. It has not developed into regional-transborder arrangements such as the links between Baja California and California in CaliBaja, or the Arizona-Mexico/Sonora-Arizona Commission.[xix] Sadly, I think, the State with the most extensive shared border “there are no fora, commissions nor periodical meeting with the authorities of the four Mexican border states.”[xx] Moreover, the Ambassador indicates that describing the situation at the border as a war zone does not help either. It is beneficial for getting funds or the signing of anti-immigrant bills. Still, it encumbers focusing on the bilateral relations' positive topics, such as economic development or the construction of binational infrastructure projects.[xxi] González Gutiérrez recommends that Mexico has to take advantage of Texas mobilization in support of NAFTA. Besides, the consulates need to assist in renewing old collaboration schemes or establishing new ones such as binational business and majors meetings.[xxii] At the same time, he declares the relevance of launching a Public Diplomacy strategy to highlight the contributions of Mexican migrants to the Lone Star State in public discussions.[xxiii] The Ambassador concludes that Mexico must cultivate a permanent dialogue with the Texas government to celebrate economic integration and be aware of the gap between reality and the public discourse.[xxiv] González Gutiérrez introduces an exciting idea that the consulate's work contributes to mitigating U.S. government institutions' absence responsible for facilitating new immigrants' integration. This idea is in line with what Francisco Javier Díaz de Léon and Víctor Peláez Millán described as the empowerment of the Mexican Community in their book´s chapter. Why is it worth reading? The chapter summarizes very well the different paths that the Golden and the Lone Star States have taken regarding immigrant issues. The Ambassador distinguishes some of the reasons this has happened, which helps comprehend the country's current situation. He also identifies areas of opportunities for Mexico´s Consular Diplomacy, particularly in closing the gap between reality and the public discourse in the Lone Star State. The Ambassador indicates that Texas offers a few advantages than other States, like its economic integration, the shared challenges at the border, and the growing Mexican population. I believe that if Mexico finds a way to work with Texas on this issue and promote greater collaboration in bilateral matters, it could lead the path to transform the current anti-immigrant attitudes and policies in other parts of the United States. To achieve this goal, I think Mexico would need to have a laser-focus Public/Consular Diplomacy long-lasting strategy, with a specific component that targets rural communities across the Lone Star State. It is interesting to reflect that the Consular Diplomacy of a country is the paradiplomacy of the other country´s State and local authorities. In this regard, this chapter contributes to the concept of Consular Diplomacy by incorporating the idea of paradiplomacy into its frame. Most of the consulates diplomatic activities are targeted toward state and local audiences. Of course, it has to consider the national context and the overall bilateral relation to be successful. By scrutinizing California and Texas trade and immigration stances and Mexico´s strategy, Ambassador González Gutiérrez encompasses paradiplomacy into Consular Diplomacy. This notion is relevant as both ideas are the different sides of the same coin. I also think that Mexico´s Consular Diplomacy in the United States had to adapt to the country´s patchwork of multiple, sometimes significantly different, federal, state, county, and authorities and policies. In the chapter, California and Texas's example proves very useful to see this characteristic and the need to have a flexible Consular Diplomacy. [i] González Gutiérrez, Carlos, “El significado de una relación especial: Las relaciones de México con Texas a la luz de su experiencia en California” in La Diplomacia Consular Mexicana en Tiempos de Trump, 2018, p. 254. [ii] Ibid. p. 255. [iii] Ibid. p. 264. [iv] Ibid. p. 254. [v] Ibid. p. 259. [vi] Migration Policy Institute, “California, Demographics and Social” and “Texas, Demographics and Social” [vii] Ibid. p. 258. [viii] Ibid. p. 259-262. [ix] Ibid. p. 262. [x] Ibid. p. 261. [xi] Ibid. p. 263. [xii] Ibid. p. 260-261. [xiii] Ibid. p. 262-264. [xiv] Ibid. p. 263. [xv] Ibid. p. 263. [xvi] Ibid. p. 263-264. [xvii] Ibid. p. 264. [xviii] Ibid. p. 264. [xix] The official name in English is Arizona-Mexico Commission, while in Spanish is the Comisión Sonora-Arizona. [xx] González Gutiérrez, Carlos, Ibid. p. 265. [xxi] Ibid. p. 265. [xxii] Ibid. p. 265. [xxiii] Ibid. p. 265. [xxiv] Ibid. p. 265. DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer, or company. In this post, I will review the last chapter of the book "The role of Consular Diplomacy in a transborder context: The case of CaliBaja", written by Ambassador Marcela Celorio. Note: I will use the term CaliBaja as presented in this chapter, e.g. CaliBaja rather than Cali Baja or Calibaja. I am skipping a few chapters because I believe the CaliBaja example is the other side of the coin of the TRICAMEX mechanism that I reviewed in this post. In this chapter, Celorio puts forward a very different experience from the other corner of the Mexico – U.S. Border: CaliBaja, a bi-national mega-region, which stands for California-Baja California. The Ambassador also discussed an example of what she defines as Transborder Consular Diplomacy. The CaliBaja initiative started in 2006-2007 and was officially launched in 2011. It comprises local and county authorities along the border between the two states but is mainly focused on the Tijuana-San Diego axis. There is even a website about the mega-region calibaja.net. It is the most-advance bilateral collaboration scheme along the nearly 2,000 miles of the shared border. As seen in the previous review, TRICAMEX comprises four consulates, focusing on immigration issues. At the same time, CaliBaja is a business-lead scheme that concentrates on trade and economic development. Ambassador Celorio divided the chapter into three:
In the introduction, the Ambassador states that the borderland is a strategic area. The challenges and opportunities faced by the Mexican Consular Diplomacy are different from those in other regions such as the U.S. East Coast or the Midwest.[i] Some of the challenges and opportunities at the border include:
Celorio explains that to administer and develop the border, authorities at the federal, state, county, and local levels on both sides have undertaken numerous activities, some unilateral and others bilateral. Some have been institutionalized like the NADBank, and some did not last very long. These actions' success or failure depends on their capacity to respond to the border communities' needs.[iii] She explains that in the case of the San Diego- Tijuana border communities, their collaboration has expanded thru the years and now includes all municipalities of Baja California, along with California's border counties, including many cities.[iv] As a result, the private sector has visualized this cooperation as a mega-region and created the term CaliBaja.[v]
Ambassador Celorio explains that even though "the international border divides the people living on both sides, there are all types of factors that unite them and make them interdependent."[vi] Among different elements that unite border communities, she highlights the following three: i) a binational community that crosses international boundaries daily, ii) the need to mutually solve transborder problems, and iii) a strong economic and labor interdependence that is the basis of the region's entire population's well-being.[vii] Celorio recognizes that CaliBaja's success "…relies on the vision of its inhabitants, business persons and authorities, who have accepted the identity of a mega-region…",[viii] that happens to be located in two different countries. The Ambassador ascertains that being on the outskirts of power in both countries became a competitive advantage, establishing local communication channels that allow to self-define as a binational mega-region.[ix] For example, she writes about the Cross Border Xpress's uniqueness, a pedestrian bridge that connects Tijuana's airport with San Diego, transforming it into a binational airport. 2. The consular function in a transborder context. In this section, the Ambassador describes the particularities of a consular office located on the Mexico-U.S. border. She goes beyond the traditional definition of a consular district and explains how the Consulate General of Mexico in San Diego is more than just a regular consular office. Celorio details the consulate's work with Mexican authorities and labels these activities as Transborder Consular Diplomacy.[x] Celorio explains that "Mexican consular offices have transformed from a simple service agency to an effective diplomatic representation of Mexico in its consular district."[xi] And when the consulate is located at the border, such as the one in San Diego, the consular office transcends its legal definition, and it becomes some sort of a transborder consulate.[xii] The Ambassador indicates that the Mexican Consulate in San Diego is a transborder consulate that performs double duties: Mexico's government spokesperson while being involved in local and CaliBaja issues abroad.[xiii] She presents three concrete examples of these transborder responsibilities: binational sewage administration, education collaboration, and crisis management.[xiv] 3. Consular Diplomacy efforts during Trump's Administration. Ambassador Celorio explains that the role of the consulates of Mexico in the U.S. has expanded into new areas with the purpose of empowering the Mexican community so they can fully integrate into the host society.[xv] She refers to this "consular activity with a prominent focus on diplomatic and social issues" as Consular Diplomacy.[xvi] A significant contribution of this chapter is the definition of Consular Diplomacy, which refers "to the handling of international relations via peripheric organizations (consulates) -in their consular districts-, with local authorities, the host society, and its migrant community to protect their rights and improve their well-being."[xvii] In Trump's era, the Ambassador indicates that Mexico has recognized Consular Diplomacy as one of its foreign policy main advantages to protect its national interests and the ones of its community living abroad.[xviii] In the case of CaliBaja, the Transborder Consular Diplomacy is executed in the context of a highly intimate cooperation between authorities on both sides of the border. And these authorities and society have responded to Washington's policies by putting first the regional and border community interests.[xix] As an example of the Transborder Consular Diplomacy, Celorio describes the participation of the San Diego consulate in the binational border security meetings, Custom and Border Protection's (CBP) leadership training, and the consular office inside CBPs facility at the San Ysidro Point of Entry.[xx] For me, the participation of border consulates in the binational border security meetings is a perfect example of Consular Diplomacy as defined by Maaike Okano-Heijmans in "Change in Consular Assistance and the Emergence of Consular Diplomacy," Consular officers participate in local meetings that deal with federal and diplomatic issues and negotiate with U.S. federal authorities in their areas of responsibility. The head offices at the capitals do not intervene or participate directly. Still, the meetings nourish the bilateral dialogue at the federal level not only between the Embassy and the Ministry with DHS but with other national stakeholders. Something similar happens with the collaboration on labor issues, particularly the Semana de Derechos Laborales (SDL) or Labor Rights Week. Ambassador Celerio closes her chapter, stating that no country can overcome alone the social and economic challenges of the 21st century. In some parts of the world, society and the government have decided to enhance efforts and create regions to meet the current reality competitively. The success of the bilateral relationship in the CaliBaja mega-region exemplifies how the Mexico-U.S. border is a source of prosperity and opportunity for both countries.[xxi] Why read this chapter? In this paper, Ambassador Celorio identifies the benefits of Consular Diplomacy regarding local issues that impact the overall bilateral relationship. CaliBaja is a significant development as they define themselves as binational and include trade to exchanges and crisis management. Besides, she states that the Transborder Consular Diplomacy helps create a prosperous, secure, and competitive region. "It is a diplomacy that adds not lessens, that helps to tear down walls and build more bridges and that recognizes that Mexico and the U.S. are more interdependent and are more integrated every day, particularly in the CaliBaja mega-region.[xxii] I believe that the CaliBaja initiative has many layers that have not yet been studied. For example, one is the issue of Place Branding of a binational mega-region and its impact on the overall Nation Brand. Another one is how a mega-region like CaliBaja can support the exercise of Soft Power in a localized way. Can the region's Soft Power overcome the two countries' unflattering characteristics? Ambassador Celorio introduces an innovative definition of Consular Diplomacy that goes beyond local issues and transcends borders, which helps develop the concept as practiced by Mexico's consular offices across the United. States. [i] Celorio, Marcela, “El papel de la diplomacia consular en el contexto transfronterizo: el caso de la CaliBaja" in La Diplomacia Consular Mexicana en tiempos de Trump, 2018, p. 271. [ii] Ibid. p. 271-272. [iii] Ibid. p. 272. [iv] The CaliBaja mega-region has a population of 6.5 million people and a GDP of 250 billion dollars. Ibid. p 274. [v] Ibid. p. 273. [vi] Ibid. p. 273. [vii] Ibid. p. 274. [viii] Ibid. p. 275. [ix] Ibid. p. 275. [x] Ibid. p. 277. [xi] Ibid. p. 276. [xii] Ibid. p. 277. [xiii] Ibid. p. 277. [xiv] Ibid. p. 278. [xv] Ibid. p. 279. [xvi] Ibid. p. 279. [xvii] Ibid. p. 280. [xviii] Ibid. p. 280. [xix] Ibid. p. 281. [xx] Ibid. p. 281. [xxi] Ibid. p. 283. [xxii] Ibid. p. 284-284. DISCLAIMER: All views expressed on this blog are that of the author and do not represent the opinions of any other authority, agency, organization, employer, or company. |
Rodrigo Márquez LartigueDiplomat interested in the development of Consular and Public Diplomacies. Archives
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